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Article
First Amendment Envelope Pushers: Revisiting the
Incitement-to-Violence Test with Messrs.
Brandenburg, Trump, & Spencer
CLAY CALVERT
This Article examines weaknesses with the United States Supreme Court’s
Brandenburg v. Ohio incitement test as its fiftieth anniversary approaches.
A lawsuit targeting Donald Trump, as well as multiple cases pitting white
nationalist Richard Spencer against public universities, provide timely
springboards for analysis. Specifically, In re Trump: 1) illustrates
difficulties in proving Brandenburg’s intent requirement via circumstantial
evidence; and 2) exposes problems regarding the extent to which past
violent responses to a person’s words satisfy Brandenburg’s likelihood
element. Additionally, the Spencer lawsuits raise concerns about: 1)
whether Brandenburg should serve as a prior restraint mechanism for
blocking potential speakers from campus before they utter a single word;
and 2) the inverse correlation between government efforts to thwart a
heckler’s veto via heightened security measures and Brandenburg’s
imminence requirement. Ultimately, this Article analyzes all three key
elements of Brandenburg—intent, imminence and likelihood—as well as its
relationship to both the heckler’s veto principle and the First Amendment
presumption against prior restraints.
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First Amendment Envelope Pushers: Revisiting the
Incitement-to-Violence Test with Messrs.
Brandenburg, Trump, & Spencer
CLAY CALVERT *
INTRODUCTION
1

“Get ’em out of here.” So barked candidate Donald Trump upon
spotting protestors at a March 2016 presidential campaign rally in
Louisville, Kentucky.2 Among them was Kashiya Nwanguma, a twentyone-year-old African American.3 She hoisted a sign depicting the
candidate’s head on a pig’s body.4
Shortly after Trump’s declaration, Nwanguma and two other
protestors, Molly Shah and Henry Brousseau, “were assaulted by three
Trump supporters.”5 The protestors “allege that they were physically
attacked by . . . Matthew Heimbach, Alvin Bamberger and an unnamed
[individual] . . . .”6
Heimbach, a twenty-five-year-old white nationalist, defended himself
online. He posted that “[w]hite Americans are getting fed up[,] and they’re
learning that they must either push back or be pushed down.”7 Conversely,
Nwanguma claims being “roughly shoved by several white men”8 and
*

Professor & Brechner Eminent Scholar in Mass Communication and Director of the Marion B.
Brechner First Amendment Project at the University of Florida, Gainesville, Fla. B.A., 1987,
Communication, Stanford University; J.D. (Order of the Coif), 1991, McGeorge School of Law,
University of the Pacific; Ph.D., 1996, Communication, Stanford University. Member, State Bar of
California and the Bar of the Supreme Court of the United States. The author thanks Hannah Beatty,
Elena Castello, Jessie Goodman, Mateo Haydar and Emerson Tyler of the University of Florida for
their helpful reviews of early drafts of this article.
1
In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 2017).
2
Id.
3
Ashley Parker, Riskiest Political Act of 2016? Protesting at Rallies for Donald Trump, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 10, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/11/us/politics/riskiest-political-act-of-2016protesting-at-rallies-for-donald-trump.html.
4
Id.
5
See In re Trump, 874 F.3d at 950 (explaining that the alleged assault led to the filing of a
complaint in Kentucky).
6
Judge to Trump: No Protection for Speech Inciting Violence, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Apr. 1,
2017), https://www.apnews.com/6b54b2ed05a246f3a20b499aaf77edb8.
7
Joe Heim, This White Nationalist Who Shoved a Trump Protester May be the Next David Duke,
WASH . POST (Apr. 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/this-white-nationalist-whoshoved-a-trump-protester-may-be-the-next-david-duke/2016/04/12/.
8
Jose A. DelReal, At Trump Events, Rally and Revolt, WASH . POST , Mar. 12, 2016, at A1.
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witnessing “a new side of humanity [she] hadn’t quite seen before.”9
Nwanguma alleges Heimbach is nearly twice her size and repeatedly
shoved her “and shouted ‘leftist scum’ at her.”10 She also asserts that
Bamberger, a seventy-five-year-old Korean War veteran,11 later began
“shoving her and striking her.”12
Similarly, Molly Shah declares she “was shoved hard from behind by”
Heimbach and, soon thereafter, “was shoved and pushed by multiple
Trump supporters.”13 Additionally, Henry Brousseau, who was then
seventeen, contends “he was punched in the stomach for shouting ‘Black
Lives Matter.’”14 A video depicting the incident resides online.15
In April 2016, Nwanguma, Shah, and Brousseau sued Trump, along
with Heimbach and Bamberger, in Kentucky state court.16 The plaintiffs
aver, among other things, that Trump “incited a riot”17 under Kentucky
law.18 More specifically, they assert his speech “was calculated to incite
violence against the Plaintiffs and others[] and does not constitute speech
protected by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution . . . .”19
Trump removed the case20 to federal court in the Bluegrass State on
diversity jurisdiction21 grounds.22
9

Heim, supra note 7.
Verified Complaint at 8, Nwanguma v. Trump, No. 16C101504 (Jefferson Cnty. Cir. Ct. Ky.
Mar.
31,
2016)
[hereinafter
Nwanguma
Verified
Complaint],
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/PR-KY-0001-0001.pdf.
11
DelReal, supra note 8.
12
Nwanguma Verified Complaint, supra note 10, at 8.
13
Id. at 9.
14
Phillip M. Bailey et al., Police Report Filed in Trump Rally Altercation, COURIER-J. (Mar. 2,
2016),
https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/elections/kentucky/2016/03/02/chargesfiled-altercation-trump-rally/81233794/.
15
Young Black Woman Pushed by Attendees at Trump Rally, G UARDIAN (Mar. 2, 2016),
https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/video/2016/mar/02/black-woman-shoved-donald-trump-rallyvideo.
16
Nwanguma Verified Complaint, supra note 10.
17
See id. at 15 (arguing that Trump’s actions at the rally violated K Y . R EV . STAT . A NN . §§
525.010, 525.040 (West 2017)).
18
See K Y . REV . STAT . A NN . § 525.010(5) (West 2017) (defining a riot as “a public disturbance
involving an assemblage of five (5) or more persons which by tumultuous and violent conduct creates
grave danger of damage or injury to property or persons or substantially obstructs law enforcement or
other government function”); id. at § 525.040(1) (West 2017) (“A person is guilty of inciting to riot
when he incites or urges five (5) or more persons to create or engage in a riot.”). Professor Margot
Kaminski points out that Kentucky’s riot statute includes “no mention of imminence, likelihood, or
intent”—the three key elements of the United States Supreme Court standard for incitement fashioned
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See Margot E. Kaminski, Incitement to Riot in the Age
of Flash Mobs, 81 U. CIN . L. REV . 1, 29 (2012).
19
Nwanguma Verified Complaint, supra note 10, at 15.
20
See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, The Roots of Removal, 77 BROOK . L. REV . 1, 6
(2011) (describing the history of the process of removal of state cases to federal court and noting that
“Removal is a popular procedure, transferring approximately thirty thousand cases annually out of state
courts and into federal courts.”).
21
See U.S. CONST . art. III, § 2 (noting that federal judicial power extends to controversies
10
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The lawsuit pivots on whether Trump’s words caused the assaults, and
in turn, whether the First Amendment23 safeguards the President’s speech.
The latter facet is critical because messages that are both directed to and
likely to incite imminent violence are not protected24 by the First
Amendment.
Incitement is unprotected because of “its similarity to action,”25 and as
“speech increases the likelihood of imminent violent action, it becomes
analogous to an action . . . .”26 Indeed, Professor Jed Rubenfeld asserts that
“[w]hen someone intentionally uses speech to bring about imminent
unlawful conduct, and it is likely that this result will ensue, he is properly
treated as having engaged himself in, as having participated in, that course
of conduct.”27 Incitement thus blurs, if not obliterates, “the fundamental
distinction between speech and conduct.”28
In particular, the United States Supreme Court held in 1969 in

“between Citizens of different States”); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (a)(1) (2012) (providing that federal district
courts shall have original diversity jurisdiction over “civil actions where the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $75,000” and where the case involves “citizens of different States”). As
one article summarizes it, diversity jurisdiction “generally permits civil litigants having different
citizenships to have their disputes adjudicated in federal court so long as the claims are big enough—
even in the absence of any federal cause of action. This form of subject matter jurisdiction has been
around since the first Judiciary Act of 1789 and has seen its popularity, among federal judges and other
members of the legal profession, wax and wane over the last two centuries.” James M. Underwood, The
Late, Great Diversity Jurisdiction, 57 CASE W. RES. L. REV . 179, 179–80 (2006).
22
Joint Notice of Removal, Nwaguma v. Trump, No. 3:16-cv-00247-DJH-HBB, *2 (W.D. Ky.
Apr. 29, 2016).
23
The First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution provides that “Congress shall make no law . . .
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. I. The Free Speech and Free
Press Clauses were incorporated more than ninety years ago as fundamental liberties applying to state
and local government through the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause. See Gitlow v. New
York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925) (noting that the fundamental liberties created by the First Amendment
are “free from impairment by the States”).
24
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that several categories of expression are unprotected by the
First Amendment. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 567 U.S. 709, 717 (2012) (noting that “advocacy
intended, and likely, to incite imminent lawless action” is among the few categories of “content-based
restrictions on speech [that] have been permitted”); Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245–
46 (2002) (“The freedom of speech has its limits; it does not embrace certain categories of speech,
including defamation, incitement, obscenity, and pornography produced with real children.” (emphasis
added)).
25
Scott Hammack, The Internet Loophole: Why Threatening Speech On-line Requires a
Modification of the Courts’ Approach to True Threats and Incitement, 36 COLUM . J.L. & SOC .
PROBS . 65, 77 (2002).
26
Id.
27
Jed Rubenfeld, The First Amendment’s Purpose, 53 STAN . L. REV . 767, 828 (2001).
28
Martin H. Redish, Fear, Loathing, and the First Amendment: Optimistic Skepticism and the
Theory of Free Expression, 76 O HIO ST . L.J. 691, 700 (2015); see also Randall P. Bezanson, Is There
Such a Thing as Too Much Free Speech?, 91 O R . L. REV . 601, 601 (2012) (“From its beginning, the
First Amendment speech guarantee has rested on two fundamental boundaries: speech versus conduct
and liberty versus utility” (emphasis added)).
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29

Brandenburg v. Ohio “that the constitutional guarantees of free speech
and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to
inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or
produce such action.”30 This test is the latest iteration of the nearly centuryold clear and present danger standard31 articulated in Schenck v. United
States.32 It is, in fact, “an even stronger version of the original clear and
present danger test.”33
The Brandenburg test, as Dean Rodney Smolla summarizes it, has
three key elements: “(1) intent (embodied in the requirement that such
speech be ‘directed to inciting or producing’ lawless action); (2)
imminence (embodied in the phrase ‘imminent lawless action’); and (3)
likelihood (embodied in the phrase ‘and is likely to incite or produce such
action’).”34 Professor Mark Strasser dubs this “a robust standard by which
to protect expression.”35 Indeed, Professor Susan Gilles observes that
“Brandenburg is a celebrated case, first and foremost, because of its
startling commitment to free speech.”36 Today, it stands as “one of the
most well-established aspects of modern constitutional doctrine.”37
Are Trump’s words unsheltered by the First Amendment per
Brandenburg? In March 2017, U.S. District Judge David Hale deemed it
“plausible that Trump’s direction to ‘get ’em out of here’ advocated the use
of force.”38 Importantly, Judge Hale reasoned that the phrase “‘get ’em out
of here’ is stated in the imperative; it was an order, an instruction, a
command.”39 Also noting the plaintiffs’ assertion that “the violence began
29

395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
Id.
31
See Susan M. Gilles, Brandenburg v. State of Ohio: An “Accidental,” “Too Easy,” and
“Incomplete” Landmark Case, 38 CAP. U. L. REV . 517, 520 (2010) (“Brandenburg is famous for
abandoning the ‘clear and present danger’ test.”); Steven M. Morrison, The System of Modern Criminal
Conspiracy, 63 C ATH . U. L. REV . 371, 389 (2014) (“The ‘clear and present danger’ test gradually
evolved into the Brandenburg test, which the Court set forth in the 1969 case of the same name . . . .”).
32
249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (“The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such
circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about
the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.”).
33
Michael J. Mannheimer, The Fighting Words Doctrine, 93 C OLUM . L. REV . 1527, 1533
(1993).
34
Rodney A. Smolla, Should the Brandenburg v. Ohio Incitement Test Apply in Media Violence
Tort Cases? 27 N. K Y . L. REV . 1, 10 (2000) (emphasis added) (quoting Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447 (1969)).
35
Mark Strasser, Mill, Holmes, Brandeis, and a True Threat to Brandenburg, 26 BYU J. PUB . L.
37, 56 (2011).
36
Gilles, supra note 31, at 520.
37
Steven G. Gey, The Brandenburg Paradigm and Other First Amendments, 12 U. PA . J. CONST .
L. 971, 977 (2010).
38
Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719, 727 (W.D. Ky. 2017), rev’d and remanded, 903
F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2018).
39
Id.
30
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40

as soon as Trump said ‘get ’em out of here,” Judge Hale concluded that
Nwanguma, Shah, and Brousseau “alleged a plausible claim of incitement
to riot.”41 He therefore refused to dismiss the case.
This, however, did not end the matter. In August 2017, Judge Hale
acknowledged the crucial nature of the Brandenburg issue in In re Trump,
emphasizing “that Trump’s statement, on its face, does not explicitly call
for violence.”42 He thus certified for immediate appeal43 to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit the following question: “Does
the First Amendment protect Donald J. Trump’s March 1, 2016 statement
‘Get ’em out of here,’ or may the statement be found to constitute
incitement of a riot?”44
Resolving this query is exceedingly difficult, affording ample
analytical fodder for this Article. Along with the raft of public
universities45 denying access to “high-profile white nationalist”46 and altright leader Richard Spencer47 because his words ostensibly could incite
violence,48 In re Trump provides a propitious opportunity to explore
40

Id. at 728.
Id.
42
Nwanguma v. Trump, No. 3:16-cv-247-DJH-HBB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126039, at *10
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2017) (order granting motion to certify for interlocutory appeal or to reconsider).
43
See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (2012) (providing that a district judge may certify in writing a question
to an appellate court if he or she believes there is “a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal . . . may materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation”).
44
Nwanguma, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126039, at *13.
45
See Susan Svrluga, University of Michigan Considers Renting Space to White Nationalist
Speaker, WASH . POST , Nov. 23, 2017, at A7 (noting that “lawsuits were filed against Michigan State,
Penn State, and Ohio State universities, seeking to force them to allow” Spencer to speak).
46
Trevor Hughes, Decades of Pent-up Anger Feed White Nationalist Crusade, USA TODAY ,
Dec. 18, 2017, at 1A.
47
Spencer is “a prominent white nationalist.” Sheryl Gay Stolberg & Brian M. Rosenthal, White
Nationalist Protest Leads to Deadly Violence, N.Y. TIMES , Aug. 13, 2017, at A1. He has also been
described as “the most recognizable alt-right voice in America.” Carlos Lozada, How Racist Trolls Will
Upend America, With or Without Trump, WASH . POST , Nov. 5, 2017, at B1.
48
See generally Complaint, Padgett v. Auburn Univ., No. 3:17-cv-00231-WKW (M.D. Ala. Apr.
18, 2017) [hereinafter Auburn Complaint], available at http://www.courthousenews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/04/Controversial-speaker-lawsuit.pdf; Plaintiff’s Verified Complaint, Padgett v.
Bd. of Trs. Mich. State Univ., No. 1:17-cv-00805 (W.D. Mich. Sept. 3, 2017) [hereinafter Michigan
State Complaint], available at http://dailycaller.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/Padgett-v-MichiganState.pdf; Padgett v. Bd. of Trs. Ohio State Univ., No. 2:17-cv-00919-ALM-KAJ (S.D. Ohio Oct. 22,
2017) [hereinafter Ohio State Complaint], available at http://www.courthousenews.com/wpcontent/uploads/2017/10/SpencerOSU.pdf; Padgett v. Bd. of Trs. Pa. State Univ., No. 4:2017cv01911
(M.D.
Pa. Oct. 19, 2017) [hereinafter Penn State Complaint], available at
http://www.almcms.com/contrib/content/uploads/documents/402/4903/Richard-Spencer-PSU.pdf. In
January 2018, Michigan State University relented, settling the lawsuit and agreeing to allow Richard
Spencer to speak on campus in March 2018, while nonetheless distancing itself from his views. Susan
Svrluga, Michigan State Agrees to Let Richard Spencer Give a Speech on Campus, WASH . POST (Jan.
18, 2018), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/grade-point/wp/2018/01/18/michigan-state-agrees-tolet-richard-spencer-give-a-speech-on-campus/?utm_term=.06d9338b681a. Kyle Bristow, the attorney
41
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weaknesses with the Brandenburg test as it rapidly approaches its golden
anniversary.
Importantly, this Article focuses only on in-person incitement
scenarios, where the speaker and audience are in close physical proximity.
This sweeps up both Trump’s campaign rallies and Spencer’s talks at
public universities. In contrast, much scholarly ink already has been spilled
on the multiple problems with applying Brandenburg to high-tech,
mediated messages such as emails, texts, and posts on social media.49
Those scenarios fall beyond the scope of this Article.
Several items complicate In re Trump. For instance, defendant Alvin
Bamberger—one of the individuals who attacked Nwanguma—claims he
“would not have acted as he did without Trump and/or the Trump
campaign’s specific urging and inspiration.”50 Bamberger’s attorney
contends his client simply acted “in response to—and [was] inspired by—
Trump and/or the Trump campaign’s urging to remove the protesters.”51
Similarly, Matthew Heimbach asserts he “acted pursuant to the requests
and directives” of Trump.52 As Heimbach bluntly avows, Trump “knew
what he was asking for.”53 In brief, Bamberger and Heimbach both
maintain they acted in response to Trump’s words. This suggests—at least
in part—that those words are not safeguarded under Brandenburg.
On the other hand, shortly after Trump uttered “Get ’em out of here,”54
he added a dose of message-softening language. Specifically, Trump said,

who filed the lawsuit against Michigan State University on behalf of Spencer, called the settlement “a
resounding First Amendment victory for the alt-right” and added that “left-wing censorship of rightwing ideas in academia is unacceptable.” David Jesse, White Supremacist Richard Spencer Will Speak
at
Michigan
State
After
All,
D ET .
FREE
PRESS
(Jan.
18,
2018),
http://www.freep.com/story/news/local/michigan/2018/01/18/richard-spencer-michigan-stateuniversity/1044354001/.
49
See, e.g., Alan K. Chen, Free Speech and the Confluence of National Security and Internet
Exceptionalism, 86 FORDHAM L. REV . 379, 391–97 (2017); John P. Cronan, The Next Challenge for
the First Amendment: The Framework for an Internet Incitement Standard, 51 C ATH . U. L. REV . 425
(2002); Daniel T. Kobil, Advocacy on Line: Brandenburg v. Ohio and Speech in the Internet Era, 31
U. TOL . L. REV . 227 (2000); Chris Montgomery, Note, Can Brandenburg v. Ohio Survive the Internet
and the Age of Terrorism?: The Secret Weakening of a Venerable Doctrine, 70 O HIO ST . L.J. 141
(2009); Russell L. Weaver, Brandenburg and Incitement in a Digital Era, 80 MISS . L.J. 1263 (2011).
50
Clarence Page, Is Trump to Blame for the Violence at His Rallies?, D AYTON D AILY N EWS
(Ohio), Apr. 19, 2017, at A9.
51
Jonathan Turley, How Louisville Could Decide Trump Immunity, USA TODAY , Apr. 24, 2016,
at 7A.
52
Attachment to Form Answer of Defendant Matthew Warren Heimbach to Complaint of
Plaintiffs Kashtya Nwanguma, Molly Shah and Henry Brousseau at 22, Nwanguma v. Trump, No.
3:16-cv-00247-DJH-HBB
(W.D.
Ky.
Apr.
17,
2016),
available
at
http://www.politico.com/f/?id=0000015b-7dcc-db04-ad5b-7ded76a30002.
53
David Zucchino, A Trump Campaign Rally Led to Shoving, and Legal Wrangling, Too, N.Y.
TIMES , May 28, 2017, at A16.
54
In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 2017).
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“[D]on’t hurt ’em—if I say ‘go get ’em,’ I get in trouble with the press.”55
Such a cautionary, backpedaling admonition seems to militate against
finding incitement.
Additionally, one might wonder whether Trump’s initial declaration
was really a call for violence or just Trump being Trump—pompously
posturing and pandering. The line between unlawful incitement and
permissible showmanship—between a plea for physical action and a
figurative chumming of political waters—is unclear.
To wit, a March 2016 Washington Post article observed that
“Trump often says that he loves having protesters at his rallies, that they
make his rallies fun. Plus, the interruptions are an opportunity to show him
bossing around and mocking liberals, often bellowing, ‘Get ’em out!’”56
Or, as a New York Times story put it, “Trump tries to turn the interruptions
to his advantage, showcasing his large crowds and commanding presence,
alternately shouting ‘Get ’em out of here’ and ‘Be nice.’”57 Trump argues
“his demands were only intended for security guards.”58 In the petition for
a writ of mandamus,59 the President’s attorneys contend his speech is fully
protected by the First Amendment.60 They assert, among other things, that:
•

“[T]he challenged speech was an exercise of Mr. Trump’s clear
First Amendment right to exclude disruptive protestors from his
campaign rally.”61
• “[P]olitical campaigns and candidates have a core First Amendment
right to associate for the purpose of expressing their political
message, which necessarily entails the right to ‘exclu[de]’
disruptive protestors who seek to express ‘views [that] [a]re at
odds with positions [the campaign] espouse[s].’”62
• “Mr. Trump and the Campaign had every right to call for the
removal of the protestors from the event. Any contrary rule would
55
56

Id.
Karen Tumulty et al., Vitriol Follows Trump on Campaign Trail, WASH . POST , Mar. 13, 2016,

at A1.
57

Parker, supra note 3, at A1.
Jason Silverstein, Trump Turned Me into Brawlin’ Goon, D AILY N EWS , Apr. 17, 2017, at
News 7.
59
See 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (2012) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of
Congress may issue all writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and
agreeable to the usages and principles of law.”); Amy E. Sloan, Appellate Fruit Salad and Other
Concepts: A Short Course in Appellate Process, 35 U. BALT . L. REV . 43, 57 (2005) (“A petition for a
writ of mandamus or prohibition is a request separate from the underlying case that is filed as an
original matter with the appellate court.”).
60
Petition for Writ of Mandamus, In re Trump, No. 17-5830, 2017 WL 3130326 (6th Cir. July 20,
2017), at *1 [hereinafter Petition for Mandamus].
61
Id. at *2.
62
Id. at *10–11 (quoting Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp. of Boston, 515 U.S.
557, 580 (1995)).
58
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destroy the practical ability of political campaigns to express their
own messages at campaign rallies without being sabotaged by
hostile protestors.”63
“Since ‘Get them out of here’ is an entirely natural and proper
expression of lawful means to protect the Campaign’s undiluted
message and association, it cannot be penalized under the First
Amendment (particularly when accompanied by the ‘Don’t hurt
’em’ admonition).”64
“Mr. Trump’s speech is protected under Brandenburg because it
was devoid of any advocacy of violence. In calling for the removal
of disruptive protestors by saying ‘Get ’em out of here,’ he did not
say a single word about unlawful force or violence. To the
contrary, he affirmatively discouraged violence by telling the
audience, ‘Don’t hurt ’em.’”65
“Mr. Trump’s call for the removal of protestors was fully protected
unless he advocated a greater degree of force than necessary to
remove them. Absent that type of unlawful advocacy, he cannot be
liable for incitement.”66

Solid, logical arguments thus exist on both sides as to whether
Trump’s speech falls outside the bounds of First Amendment refuge. Put
bluntly: reciting Brandenburg’s elements67 is simple, but applying them is
complicated.
To further examine the Brandenburg quagmire, Part I lays the
foundation for later Sections by providing primers on three subjects: (1)
the current incitement standard; (2) the heckler’s veto principle; and (3) the
presumption against prior restraints on expression.68 Next, Part II drills
deeper into In re Trump, focusing on the challenges the case exposes for
satisfying two facets of Brandenburg—intent and likelihood.69 Part III then
shifts attention to multiple lawsuits filed in 2017 against public universities
that denied Richard Spencer campus access because his words allegedly
are likely, per Brandenburg, to incite imminent lawless action.70 The
Spencer lawsuits, Part III reveals, illustrate Brandenburg’s complex
relationship with First Amendment doctrines regarding both prior restraints
and the heckler’s veto. Finally, Part IV concludes by calling on the
Supreme Court to clarify the meaning and application of Brandenburg’s
63

Id. at *12.
Id. at *13.
65
Id. at *14.
66
Id. at *22.
67
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (setting forth the three key elements of the
Brandenburg test).
68
See infra Part I.
69
See infra Part II.
70
See infra Part III.
64

2019]

FIRST AMENDMENT ENVELOPE PUSHERS

127

elements and its relationship to the prior restraint and heckler’s veto
doctrine as the case nears its fiftieth anniversary.71
I. PRIMERS ON KEY CONCEPTS: INCITEMENT TO VIOLENCE, THE
HECKLER’S VETO, AND PRIOR RESTRAINTS ON EXPRESSION
This Part has three Sections. Section A provides detailed background
on the Brandenburg test, while Section B addresses the heckler’s veto
principle. Finally, Section C briefly reviews the general presumption
against the constitutionality of prior restraints on expression.
A. The Brandenburg Test for Incitement to Violence
As noted above,72 in 1969, the Supreme Court held in Brandenburg v.
Ohio that the “constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do
not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of
law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action.”73 In its per curiam opinion, the Court struck down a criminal
syndicalism statute because it punished “mere advocacy”74 and failed to
distinguish it “from incitement to imminent lawless action.”75 The Court
reiterated this point in 1982, observing that “mere advocacy of the use of
force or violence does not remove speech from the protection of the First
Amendment.”76
Indeed, Brandenburg draws a crucial dichotomy between “the mere
abstract teaching . . . of the moral propriety or even moral necessity for a
resort to force and violence”77 on the one hand, and speech that is essential
for “preparing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action”78 on
the other.79 Furthermore, Brandenburg renders “irrelevant whether or not
the speech offends; all that matters is the likelihood that the harm of
imminent lawlessness will result.”80 In a nutshell, Brandenburg serves up
71

See infra Part IV.
Supra note 29–30 and accompanying text.
73
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
74
Id. at 449.
75
Id.
76
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 927 (1982) (emphasis added).
77
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447–48 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 297–98
(1961)).
78
Id.
79
See O. Lee Reed, The State is Strong but I Am Weak: Why the “Imminent Lawless Action”
Standard Should Not Apply to Targeted Speech That Threatens Individuals With Violence, 38 A M .
BUS. L.J. 177, 190 (2000) (“[In] Brandenburg v. Ohio[,] . . . mere abstract advocacy of violence was
insufficient to permit the government to limit otherwise free speech.”).
80
John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF. L. REV .
653, 669 (1994).
72
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“a very speech-protective way of drawing the definitional line between
advocacy of illegal action that is encompassed within the First Amendment
and such speech that is not.”81
The case centered on a speech by Ku Klux Klan leader Clarence
Brandenburg that accompanied a cross burning attended by approximately
a dozen Klan members, “some of whom carried firearms.”82 Other than one
television journalist and a cameraman, no one else was present on the
Hamilton County, Ohio farm.83 At this gathering, the Klansman hurled
insults about African-Americans and Jews.84 He also informed his hooded
colleagues that “[w]e’re not a revengent [sic] organization, but if our
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it’s possible that there might have to be some
revengeance [sic] taken.”85
Because no one else was nearby to hear such vitriol—only a dozen
Klansmen, a reporter, and a cameraman—it appears evident these
admonitions were not likely to produce the brand of imminent lawless
action the Brandenburg test requires. Furthermore, Clarence Brandenburg
qualified his messages in conditional terms rather than expressing them as
immediate directives. In particular, “revengeance” was only “possible” and
simply “might” be needed “if” government officials continued to suppress
whites.86
The rambling speech ultimately was protected, as Professor Alexander
Tsesis observes, because it consisted merely of “abstract statements voiced
only in the presence of like-minded individuals and invited guests.”87
Tsesis points out, as noted above, that “the only people present at the rally
were Ku Klux Klan members and a camera crew, whom the Klan
invited.”88
Under Brandenburg, as Professor James Wilson explains, “a
prosecutor must prove . . . (1) advocacy, (2) of the use of force or of law
violation, (3) the intention to incite or produce unlawful action, (4) the
imminence of the unlawful act, and (5) the likelihood that such action will
be produced.”89 Wilson maintains that “prosecutors will have the easiest
81
Norman T. Deutsch, Professor Nimmer Meets Professor Schauer (and Others): An Analysis of
“Definitional Balancing” as a Methodology for Determining the “Visible Boundaries of the First
Amendment”, 39 A KRON L. REV . 483, 507 (2006).
82
Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 445.
83
Id.
84
See id. at 446 n.1 (providing examples of Brandenburg’s repeated use of racial slurs).
85
Id. at 446.
86
Id. (emphasis added).
87
Alexander Tsesis, Inflammatory Speech: Offense Versus Incitement, 97 MINN . L. REV . 1145,
1159 (2013).
88
Alexander Tsesis, Terrorist Speech on Social Media, 70 V AND . L. REV . 651, 667 (2017).
89
James G. Wilson, Surveying the Forms of Doctrine on the Bright Line-Balancing Test
Continuum, 27 A RIZ . ST . L.J. 773, 804 (1995).
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time proving advocacy of the use of force or law violation, more difficulty
with mens rea, and either an easier or harder time proving imminence and
likelihood, depending on whether or not force or lawlessness eventually
occurred.”90 Mens rea is “the Latin phrase for a guilty mind.”91
In other words, the rubber meets the road with the same three factors
described earlier—intent (mens rea), imminence, and likelihood.92
Professors Julie Seaman & David Sloan Wilson concur that the
Brandenburg test “encompass[es] the three elements of (1) intent; (2)
imminence; and (3) likelihood.”93 These three components of
Brandenburg94 are part of what Professor Christina Wells calls a
“weighted”95 balancing approach “requiring the Court to weigh
the likelihood and magnitude of harm against the right to free
expression.”96 The test is weighted because, in balancing harm against free
speech, it “heavily favors speech in the absence of concrete evidence of
intentional and likely imminent harm.”97
Professor Jed Rubenfeld, however, disagrees with Wells’s assertion
that “magnitude of harm”98 is important under Brandenburg.99 As
Rubenfeld views it, magnitude of harm is “a factor with which
Brandenburg does not concern itself. As far as Brandenburg is concerned,
a person who deliberately incites others to commit a minor offense is in the
same position as a person who incites others to riot. In both cases, the
speech is equally unprotected.”100
Rubenfeld, in fact, rejects Wells’ contention that Brandenburg
involves a balancing approach.101 Instead, he contends it is better
considered “as a test to determine whether an individual has intentionally
used speech so closely and directly engaged with a particularized course of
prohibited conduct that the individual may be treated as having participated

90

Id.
John Villasenor, Technology and the Role of Intent in Constitutionally Protected Expression, 39
H ARV . J.L. & PUB . POL’ Y 631, 642 (2016).
92
Smolla, supra note 34.
93
Julie Seaman & David Sloan Wilson, #FreeSpeech, 48 A RIZ . ST . L.J. 1013, 1028, n.83 (2016).
94
See Hannah Steinblatt, E-Incitement: A Framework for Regulating the Incitement of Criminal
Flash Mobs, 22 FORDHAM I NTELL. PROP . MEDIA & ENT . L.J. 753, 770 (2012)
(“The Brandenburg test is comprised of three distinct elements: intent, imminence, and likelihood.”).
95
Christina E. Wells, Bringing Structure to the Law of Injunctions Against Expression, 51 C ASE
W. RES. L. REV . 1, 48 (2000).
96
Id. at 47.
97
Id. at 48.
98
Id. at 47.
99
See Rubenfeld, supra note 27, at 829 (explaining how Brandenberg perceives the magnitude
of harm).
100
Id. (emphasis added).
101
See id. (“Despite appearances, the Brandenburg test cannot be understood as a balancing
test.”).
91
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in that conduct.”
With this overview in mind, what do the three key elements of
Brandenburg mean? The following subsections separately examine each
one.
1. Intent
In Hess v. Indiana,103 the Court clarified that Brandenburg’s “directed
to” facet means that a speaker’s words must be “intended to produce”104
unlawful action.105 Furthermore, Hess suggested that intent can be
determined by a “rational inference from the import of the language.”106
Put differently, the Brandenburg standard features a “mens rea
requirement that the speaker had the purpose to produce . . . harm.”107
Including a mens rea or state-of-mind component marked a significant
development in the evolution of the incitement doctrine because, as Erwin
Chemerinsky writes, “[n]one of the earlier tests had contained an intent
requirement.”108
An intent requirement is vital for protecting free expression because,
without it, incitement would be a strict liability crime.109 Strict liability
offensives, in turn, harm First Amendment interests because they chill
speech.110 The danger of self-censorship stemming from strict liability, of
course, was also a primary reason the Supreme Court adopted the actual
malice standard in defamation law in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan.111
102

Id.
414 U.S. 105 (1973).
104
Id. at 108–09.
105
See Eugene Volokh, The Freedom of Speech and Bad Purposes, 63 UCLA L. REV . 1366,
1370 (2016) (“Hess v. Indiana held that ‘directed to’ here means intended to persuade people to act
illegally.”).
106
Hess, 414 U.S. at 109.
107
Volokh, supra note 105, at 1383.
108
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY , CONSTITUTIONAL LAW : PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 1375 (5th ed.
2017).
109
Leslie Kendrick, Free Speech and Guilty Minds, 114 COLUM . L. REV . 1255, 1281 (2014)
(“Strict liability penalizes a speaker for an unintended aspect of her message and disregards her actual
communicative projects. It reaches speakers who do not intend harm and who are reasonably unaware
of the harmful aspects of their speech.”).
110
Id. at 1277 (“The chilling effect is a free-speech principle that could explain why strict liability
is inappropriate without making speaker’s intent intrinsic to speech protection. Speakers who face strict
liability will stay silent when uncertain of the accuracy of their information.”); see also Jonathon W.
Penney, Chilling Effects: Online Surveillance and Wikipedia Use, 31 B ERKELEY TECH . L.J. 117, 125
(2016) (“The idea that government laws or actions might chill people’s free activities gained its most
prominent early expression in the United States during the Cold War. The ‘chilling effects doctrine,’ a
legal doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence, took shape in a series of cases decided in the 1950s
and 60s that dealt with anti-communist state measures. Essentially, the doctrine encouraged courts to
treat rules or government actions that ‘might deter’ the free exercise of First Amendment rights ‘with
suspicion.’”).
111
376 U.S. 254 (1964). The Court in Sullivan held that Alabama’s strict liability provision in its
103
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As Professor Frederick Schauer observed, the chilling effect doctrine
played a “critical role”112 in Sullivan. Including an intent component in
Brandenburg thus shields and safeguards what Professor Susan Gilles
aptly dubs “the ‘accidental’ inciter—the speaker whose language triggers a
riot, but who had no intent to incite such lawlessness.”113 Additionally, the
intent element separates provocative speech (protected) from incitement
(unprotected).114
Proving a speaker’s intent, as this Article’s discussion of In re Trump
later demonstrates,115 is far from easy. Professor Eugene Volokh, for
example, points out that:
[A]ny conclusion about the speaker’s purpose will usually
just be a guess. There will often be several plausible
explanations for just what the speaker wanted—to push an
ideology, to convey useful information, to sell more books, to
titillate readers by being on the edge of what is permitted,
and more.116
In contrast to Brandenburg, the Court’s test for another unprotected
libel regime was “constitutionally deficient for failure to provide the safeguards for freedom of speech
and of the press that are required by the First and Fourteenth Amendments in a libel action brought by a
public official against critics of his official conduct.” Id. at 264. The Court reasoned that “[a] rule
compelling the critic of official conduct to guarantee the truth of all his factual assertions—and to do so
on pain of libel judgments virtually unlimited in amount—leads to a comparable ‘self-censorship.’” Id.
at 279. To rectify this situation, the Court adopted a fault standard—actual malice—that focuses on the
subjective state of mind of the defendant at the time of publication about the veracity of the statements
at issue. Id. at 279–80. See also Matthew D. Bunker, Constitutional Baselines: First Amendment
Theory, State Action and the “New Realism,” 5 C OMM . L. & POL ’ Y 1, 22 (2000) (“In Sullivan, there is
a direct relation between the legal rule (strict liability in defamation) and the inhibition of important
political speech about government officials.”); David F. Partlett & Russell L. Weaver, Remedies,
Neutral Rules and Free Speech, 39 A KRON L. REV . 1183, 1189 (2006) (“In Sullivan, the Court was
concerned about the chilling effect of defamation judgments on reporting.”); Stephen A. Siegel,
Injunctions for Defamation, Juries, and the Clarifying Lens of 1868, 56 BUFF. L. REV . 655, 656
(2008) (“Before New York Times v. Sullivan, defamation was a strict liability tort.” (citation omitted));
Diane L. Zimmerman, Requiem for a Heavyweight: A Farewell to Warren and Brandeis’s Privacy
Tort, 68 CORNELL L. REV . 291, 315 (1983) (“The Court ruled that a strict liability libel standard is
unconstitutional.”).
112
Frederick Schauer, Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the “Chilling Effect,” 58
B.U. L. REV . 685, 705 (1978).
113
Gilles, supra note 31, at 523.
114
Daniel Ortner, The Terrorist’s Veto: Why the First Amendment Must Protect Provocative
Portrayals of the Prophet Muhammad, 12 N W . U. J.L. & SOC . POL’ Y 1, 33 (2016) (“The intent of the
speaker, and whether the speech is ‘directed to inciting,’ is critical to determining whether incitement
occurred. It is this key element that distinguishes provocative speech from incitement.” (quoting
MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.03 (AM. LAW INST. 2015)).
115
See infra Part II (explaining that without a concession from Trump regarding the intent of his
statements, the evidence of his intent is merely circumstantial).
116
Eugene Volokh, Crime-Facilitating Speech, 57 STAN . L. REV . 1095, 1186 (2005). Volokh
adds that “when the law really requires a mens rea of purpose . . . decision[-]making necessarily
requires a good deal more conjecture.” Id. (citations omitted).
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category of speech related to violence—fighting words—lacks an intent
element.117 Additionally, the Supreme Court has yet to definitively decide
whether another brand of unprotected speech that portends violence—true
threats—entails a mens rea component.118
2. Imminence
The second key facet of the Brandenburg test is imminence.119
Problematically, as Professor Martin Redish points out, “[t]he Supreme
Court has never explicitly laid out its understanding of
the imminence required by the test.”120 Yet Redish asserts that “the test
must require at least some showing of temporal imminence, lest the word
be rendered linguistically incoherent.”121
In other words, there must be a likelihood of the unlawful conduct
117
The Supreme Court held in Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire that fighting words constitute one of
the “well-defined and narrowly limited classes of speech” that are not safeguarded by the First
Amendment. 315 U.S. 568, 571 (1942). The Court in Chaplinsky defined fighting words as those
whose “very utterance inflict injury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace.” Id. at 572. The
Court later specified that fighting words are limited to “personally abusive epithets which, when
addressed to the ordinary citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to provoke
violent reaction.” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). It added that the words must be directed
to a particular person and be interpreted “as a direct personal insult.” Id. The fighting words test,
however, lacks a mens rea component. As Justice Clarence Thomas recently wrote, fighting words may
be prohibited “without proof of an intent to provoke a violent reaction.” Elonis v. United States, 135 S.
Ct. 2001, 2027 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Professor Larry Alexander elaborates that “[r]equiring
a mens rea of purpose serves no obvious free speech value. Nor is it consistent with the Court’s own
approach to fighting words or to hostile audiences, neither of which require, as a precondition to
sanctioning the speaker, that the speaker intend to provoke the audience to violence.” Larry Alexander,
Redish on Freedom of Speech, 107 NW. U. L. REV . 593, 596 (2013) (emphasis in original omitted).
118
In Elonis v. United States, the Court resolved a threats case on statutory grounds and thus
found it “not necessary to consider any First Amendment issues.” 135 S.Ct. at 2012. The question
presented to the Court in the Elonis petition was: Whether, consistent with the First Amendment and
Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343 (2003), conviction of threatening another person requires proof of the
defendant’s subjective intent to threaten, as required by the Ninth Circuit and the supreme courts of
Massachusetts, Rhode Island, and Vermont; or whether it is enough to show that a “reasonable person”
would regard the statement as threatening, as held by other federal courts of appeals and state courts of
last resort. Question Presented, Elonis v. United States, 730 F.3d 321 (2015) (No. 13-983) (June 16,
2014). See also Perez v. Florida, 137 S. Ct. 853, 855 (2017) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (“The Court
should also decide precisely what level of intent suffices under the First Amendment—a question we
avoided two Terms ago in Elonis.”). Writing subsequent to the Court’s ruling in Elonis, Eugene Volokh
notes that “the Court hasn’t even resolved whether statements are punishable only (a) if the speaker
intends to put a person in fear, or whether it is enough that (b) a reasonable speaker would realize that
the statement would put a person in fear.” Eugene Volokh, The “Speech Integral to Criminal Conduct”
Exception, 101 CORNELL L. REV . 981, 1005 (2016).
119
See supra note 34 and accompanying text (identifying the three key elements of the
Brandenburg test).
120
Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of
Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV . 1159, 1180 (1982).
121
Martin H. Redish & Michael J.T. Downey, Criminal Conspiracy as Free Expression, 76 A LB .
L. REV . 697, 730 (2012–2013).
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occurring “in the near future” and “within a very limited timeframe.”123
As Redish encapsulates it, “most commentators have had little or no
trouble concluding that the Court’s opinion in Brandenburg adopts a
highly protective imminence test.”124
Indeed, the Court in Hess v. Indiana125 made clear that “advocacy of
illegal action at some indefinite future time”126—evidenced by the word
“later” in the defendant’s statement “[w]e’ll take the fucking street
later”127—fails to satisfy the imminence requirement.128 Thus, while
Gregory Hess’s words during an anti-war protest “might tend to lead to
violence, this did not satisfy the requirement that advocacy be directed at
inciting or producing imminent lawless action that is likely to be
produced.”129 Professor Dan Coenen recently dubbed this “the indefinitefuture logic of Hess.”130 Professor Michal Buchhandler-Raphael adds that
“[i]n light of Hess, imminent means nothing but immediate action, which
is an almost impossible burden to satisfy.”131
Addressing the imminence element, Professor Enrique Armijo adds
that “[a]n unspoken predicate for a finding of imminent incitement has
traditionally been a shared physical space between speaker and
audience.”132 Similarly, Joshua Azriel contends that “[t]he Brandenburg
test applies to verbally spoken face-to-face speech”133 and “assumes a
speaker-audience relationship that does not exist with Web sites.”134
Chemerinsky emphasizes that a significant problem is the
Brandenburg Court’s failure to explain how imminence should be

122

Id.
Asma T. Uddin, Free Speech and Public Order Exceptions: A Case for the U.S. Standard,
2015 BYU L. REV . 727, 762 (2015).
124
Martin H. Redish, Unlawful Advocacy and Free Speech Theory: Rethinking the Lessons of the
McCarthy Era, 73 U. CIN . L. REV . 9, 65 (2004).
125
414 U.S. 105 (1973).
126
Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
127
Id. at 107.
128
See Mark Strasser, Incitement, Threats, and Constitutional Guarantees: First Amendment
Protections pre- and post-Elonis, 14 U.N.H. L. REV . 163, 173 (2016) (examining the U.S. Supreme
Court’s ruling in Hess and emphasizing that “[t]he lack of imminence meant the speech at issue could
not be criminalized under Brandenburg.”).
129
R. Randall Kelso, The Structure of Modern Free Speech Doctrine: Strict Scrutiny,
Intermediate Review, and “Reasonableness” Balancing, 8 ELON L. REV . 291, 328 (2016).
130
Dan T. Coenen, Freedom of Speech and the Criminal Law, 97 B.U. L. R EV . 1533, 1553 n.110
(2017).
131
Michal Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV . 1667, 1677
(2015) (emphasis added).
132
Enrique Armijo, Kill Switches, Forum Doctrine, and the First Amendment’s Digital Future, 32
CARDOZO A RTS & ENT . L.J. 411, 459 (2014).
133
Joshua Azriel, The Internet and Hate Speech: An Examination of the Nuremberg Files Case,
10 COMM . L. & POL’ Y 477, 496 (2005).
134
Id. at 495–96.
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appraised.
In practice, Brandenburg’s imminence element requires
government officials to “exercise restraint in their regulation of expressive
freedoms unless the exercise of those freedoms threatens imminent
harm.”136 In other words, police must refrain from arresting a speaker if the
possibility of harm is too distant. As Professor Margot Kaminski states:
Brandenburg suggests that when action is advocated far
enough in advance, police can prepare for it and avert danger
through preparation; therefore, suppression or punishment of
non-imminent speech is not allowed. It is only when the
danger is so imminent that police cannot prepare themselves
that regulation of incitement is justified.137
With this background on Brandenburg’s imminence component in
mind, the next section turns to the likelihood element.
3. Likelihood
The Court in Brandenburg held that speech is proscribed as incitement
only if it “is likely to incite or produce”138 violence or unlawful conduct.
Unfortunately, as Professor Thomas Healy points out, “Brandenburg does
not tell us how likely it must be that speech will lead to unlawful
conduct.”139 Furthermore, Brandenburg fails to answer how likelihood is to
be appraised.140
Despite such flaws, likelihood is an important facet of Brandenburg.
That is because, even if a speaker intends for violence to occur—the first
of the three key elements141—he nonetheless will be protected if he is
ineffectual or inept in steeling an audience to action.142 Put differently, a
non-persuasive speaker is less likely to have his words followed. Viewed
collectively, Brandenburg’s likelihood and imminence requirements
ensure “that the danger is in fact not speculative and that the government’s
interest in preventing the violence is not pretextual.”143
It seems clear, however, that past violent reactions to a speaker’s
words can serve as evidence in predicting whether they are likely to cause
violence in the future. For instance, in considering whether the Internet
135

C HEMERINSKY , supra note 108, at 1375.
John Inazu, Unlawful Assembly as Social Control, 64 UCLA L. REV . 2, 38 (2017).
137
Kaminski, supra note 18, at 81.
138
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (emphasis added).
139
Thomas Healy, Brandenburg in a Time of Terror, 84 N OTRE D AME L. REV . 655, 660 (2009)
(emphasis added).
140
C HEMERINSKY , supra note 108, at 1375.
141
See supra Section I.A.1 (footnote omitted) (presenting the three elements).
142
See Gilles, supra note 31, at 523 (footnote omitted) (noting that Brandenburg protects
“ineffective” speakers).
143
S. Elizabeth Wilborn Malloy & Ronald J. Krotoszynski, Jr., Recalibrating the Cost of Harm
Advocacy: Getting Beyond Brandenburg, 41 WM . & MARY L. REV . 1159, 1197 (2000).
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postings of white supremacist William White constituted incitement under
Brandenburg, a federal district court in 2013 reasoned:
[T]he evidence fails to establish that White’s postings have
previously inspired any action—imminent or otherwise. In
the absence of such evidence, the fact that White published
his statements to the Internet, alone—although deeply
troubling—is not enough to show that the actions suggested
therein were likely to be immediately carried out by White’s
readers. 144
Thus, likelihood ultimately depends on a contextual approach that
accounts not only for the words used, but also the surrounding context in
which those words are uttered. Context includes, as Professor David
Crump asserts, the medium through which the message is conveyed, the
audience to whom it is addressed, and other related messages.145
With this primer on Brandenburg in mind, the next Section briefly
reviews the heckler’s veto principle.
B. The Heckler’s Veto Principle
The heckler’s veto principle, as Professor Brett Johnson recently
wrote, is the precept “that state actors have a duty to protect speakers from
hostile audiences who would seek to either do harm to speakers or threaten
to do harm and thereby force law enforcement to silence speakers.”146 A
heckler’s veto thus occurs “when a crowd or audience’s reaction to a
speech or message is allowed to control or silence that speech or
message.”147
Imagine, for instance, a comedian being heckled off the stage at a
comedy club during his act. That would be tantamount to a heckler’s veto.
If the club were run by the government, however, it would be obligated to
protect the comedian and allow his performance to continue unimpeded.
In the typical heckler’s veto scenario, “an unpopular minority has
insisted upon exercising its rights in spite of the probable opposition of the
majority of the community.”148 That certainly is the case when white
nationalist Richard Spencer speaks on public university campuses, as Part
III later examines. For example, when Spencer spoke in October 2017 at
144
In re White, No. 2:07cv342, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 133148, at *221 (E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2013)
(emphasis added) (order denying motion for sanctions).
145
David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative Torts, and the
Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 G A . L. REV . 1, 56 (1994).
146
Brett G. Johnson, The Heckler’s Veto: Using First Amendment Theory and Jurisprudence to
Understand Current Audience Reactions Against Controversial Speech, 21 COMM . L. & POL’ Y 175,
219 (2016).
147
C LAY CALVERT ET AL., MASS MEDIA LAW 44 (20th ed. 2018).
148
Ruth McGaffey, The Heckler’s Veto: A Reexamination, 57 MARQ . L. REV . 39, 39 (1973).
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the University of Florida, his disquieting views drew overwhelming
opposition and required enormous law enforcement presence to maintain
the peace.149
The heckler’s veto doctrine holds that public universities, as
government actors, must protect Spencer’s offensive speech150 because
they cannot “hide behind the unpleasant reaction of some portions of the
public in order to silence a speaker.”151 As Owen Fiss summarized it, the
doctrine “recognizes that when a mob is angered by a speaker and
jeopardizes the public order by threatening the speaker, the policeman
must act to preserve the opportunity of an individual to speak. The duty of
the policeman is to restrain the mob.”152
By analyzing recent lawsuits filed on behalf of Richard Spencer, Part
III explores the tension between the heckler’s veto doctrine and
Brandenburg’s likelihood requirement.153 Specifically, Part III argues that
the more money universities spend on police to prevent a heckler’s veto
and to safeguard Spencer’s right to speak,154 the less likely it is that his
words will constitute unlawful incitement under Brandenburg.155 That is
because a massive law enforcement turnout not only reduces the chances
of Spencer being attacked by a hostile mob, but also makes it less probable
his followers will commit violence, assuming they recognize the increased
odds of being arrested. This result, Part III argues, is somewhat
disconcerting.
It means there will be some instances where the government pays to
protect speech that, were it not for the heckler’s veto doctrine and a large
police presence, could be cut off and suppressed under Brandenburg. In
149
See Andrew Pantazi & Nate Monroe, Shouting Match; Hostile Audience Drowns Out White
Nationalist’s Speech, FLA. TIMES-UNION (Oct. 20, 2017), at A-1 (“A crowd of protesters filled a
University of Florida hall . . . and greeted the white nationalist Richard Spencer with mocking chants
and raised fists, denying the provocateur an unchallenged platform to share his widely derided views on
race in America . . . . Thousands had swamped the university to challenge Spencer’s appearance, which
cost about $600,000 for security and had prompted Gov. Rick Scott to declare a state of emergency for
the area.”).
150
See Mark A. Rabinowitz, Nazis in Skokie: Fighting Words or Heckler’s Veto, 28 D E PAUL L.
REV . 259, 274–75 (1979) (“The principle underlying the Heckler’s Veto Doctrine is that freedom of
speech may not be abridged merely because the content of such speech may be offensive to some of the
hearers.” (footnote omitted)).
151
Cheryl A. Leanza, Heckler’s Veto Case Law as a Resource for Democratic Discourse, 35
H OFSTRA L. REV . 1305, 1306 (2007).
152
Owen M. Fiss, Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 I OWA L. REV . 1405, 1417 (1986).
153
See supra Section I.A.3 (addressing the likelihood facet of the Brandenburg incitement test).
154
In Forsyth Cty. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992), the Supreme Court held
unconstitutional an ordinance that permitted “a government administrator to vary the fee for assembling
or parading to reflect the estimated cost of maintaining public order.” Id. at 124. Writing for a fivejustice majority, Harry Blackmun reasoned that “[s]peech cannot be financially burdened, any more
than it can be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob.” Id. at 134–35
(citations omitted).
155
See infra Section III (presenting this argument).
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other words, Spencer can get away with words that—were it not for the
appearance of police mandated by the heckler’s veto canon—Brandenburg
would squelch. Attendance by government-paid police thus assists Spencer
in two ways: first, by reducing the odds his speech will be silenced by a
heckler’s veto, and second, by decreasing the likelihood his speech will
spark his supporters to commit violence.
C. Prior Restraints on Expression
Although the definition of “prior restraint” is contested,156 it is
generally considered a “restraint on future speech”157 and frequently takes
the form of a “court order[] that actually forbid[s] speech activities.”158 Put
slightly differently, “[a] prior restraint is an official restriction upon a
communication before it is published.”159 Twin tenets of First Amendment
jurisprudence, in turn, hold that such restraints are presumptively
unconstitutional,160 and that the government carries a “heavy burden of
attempting to overcome that presumption.”161 As Professor Edward Carter
writes, “[t]here is a deep and longstanding aversion in First Amendment
jurisprudence to prior restraints.”162
While prior restraints imposed by the government are presumptively
invalid, the Supreme Court allows them in a few specific circumstances.163

156
See Michael I. Meyerson, The Neglected History of the Prior Restraint Doctrine:
Rediscovering the Link Between the First Amendment and the Separation of Powers, 34 I ND . L. REV .
295, 297 (2001) (“[T]here is currently no generally-accepted legal definition of the prior restraint
doctrine.”); Marin Scordato, Distinction Without a Difference: A Reappraisal of the Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 68 N.C. L. REV . 1, 2 (1989) (“Despite the frequency with which the doctrine of prior
restraint is cited in court opinions and the level of general recognition it has achieved, relevant case law
does not provide a concise and logically coherent definition of a prior restraint on speech.”).
157
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993).
158
Id.
159
James L. Oakes, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint Since the Pentagon Papers, 15 U. MICH . J.L.
REFORM 497, 498 (1982).
160
See Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 556 (1976) (observing that the First Amendment
guarantees of free speech and a free press “afford special protection against orders that prohibit the
publication or broadcast of particular information or commentary—orders that impose a ‘previous’ or
‘prior’ restraint on speech”); Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963) (“Any system of
prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional
validity.”).
161
Steven Helle, Prior Restraint by the Backdoor: Conditional Rights, 39 V ILL. L. REV . 817, 842
(1994) (footnote omitted).
162
Edward L. Carter & Brad Clark, Death of Procedural Safeguards: Prior Restraint, Due
Process and the Elusive First Amendment Value of Content Neutrality, 11 COMM . L. & POL’ Y 225,
228 (2006).
163
See Ariel L. Bendor, Prior Restraint, Incommensurability, and the Constitutionalism of Means,
68 FORDHAM L. REV . 289, 299 (1999) (“Like freedom of speech, however, the prohibition against
prior restraint of speech is not absolute. A line of exceptions allows the application of prior restraint in
certain circumstances.”).
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Most notably, Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes’s “famous dicta”164 in
Near v. Minnesota165 in 1931 articulated several instances where prior
restraints might be constitutional.166 Forty years later, Justice William
Brennan used a part of that dicta to support his stance in New York Times
Co. v. United States.167 Justice Brennan wrote there that “only
governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably,
directly, and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to
imperiling the safety of a transport already at sea can support even the
issuance of an interim restraining order.”168
Significantly for purposes of this Article, the Court in Near suggested
that prior restraints may be permissible to protect “[t]he security of the
community life . . . against incitements to acts of violence.”169 The Court’s
current test for incitement to acts of violence, of course, is the
Brandenburg standard.170 Thus, when police on the scene believe Richard
Spencer’s continued speaking will incite imminent and likely violence,
they can order him—per Brandenburg—to stop talking. This constitutes a
prior restraint because Spencer is stifled from continuing with and
finishing his speech.
Yet this scenario is particularly troubling because the prior restraint on
Spencer occurs without, as First Amendment scholar Martin Redish
characterizes it, the benefit of “a full and fair hearing before an
independent judicial forum.”171 Redish points out that although “[t]he
requirement of a full and fair hearing before an independent judicial forum
for the adjudication of constitutional rights is a widely accepted premise of
modern constitutional thinking,”172 this “principle has received inconsistent
attention in the Supreme Court’s decisions applying the prior restraint

164
Christopher Dunn, Balancing the Right to Protest in the Aftermath of September 11, 40 H ARV .
C.R.-C.L. L. R EV . 327, 329 (2005).
165
283 U.S. 697 (1931).
166
See id. at 716 (identifying times of war, “obscene publications,” and “incitements to acts of
violence and the overthrow by force of orderly government” as the “exceptional cases” when a
“previous restraint” may be permissible).
167
403 U.S. 713 (1971).
168
Id. at 726–27 (Brennan, J., concurring). See Mary-Rose Papandrea, Lapdogs, Watchdogs, and
Scapegoats: The Press and National Security Information, 83 IND . L.J. 233, 279 (2008) (noting that
“[Justice] Brennan drew this standard from dicta in the Court’s prior opinion in Near v. Minnesota,”
particularly, Near’s statement “that prior restraints are permissible in cases involving ‘actual
obstruction to [the government’s] recruiting service or the publication of the sailing dates of transports
or the number and location of troops’”) (quoting Near, 283 U.S. at 716).
169
Near, 283 U.S. at 716.
170
See Uddin, supra note 123, at 770 (“The Court announced its current test, incitement to
imminent violence, in Brandenburg v. Ohio in 1969.”).
171
Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment
Theory, 70 V A . L. REV . 53, 100 (1984).
172
Id. at 55.
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173

doctrine.”
It is more than a little bit conceivable, in turn, that a judge might later
conclude the police, under the heat and pressure of the moment to make a
snap judgment, erred in stopping Spencer’s speech—that his words had not
risen to the level of Brandenburg incitement—and violated his First
Amendment rights. This issue, as well as whether Brandenburg can serve
as a prior restraint tool to preemptively stop Spencer from even appearing
on a campus due to earlier violence elsewhere, is explored in Part III.
With this primer on the incitement test, the heckler’s veto doctrine and
the presumption against prior restraints providing necessary context, the
next Part of the Article illustrates how In re Trump exposes key problems
for courts tasked with applying Brandenburg in situations where no clear
exhortation to violence exists.
II. EXAMINING IN RE TRUMP MORE CLOSELY: PROBLEMS WITH PROVING
INTENT AND LIKELIHOOD
This Part has two sections. The first examines the question of intent
under Brandenburg in In re Trump, while the second analyzes the issue of
likelihood.
A. Trump’s Intent
As addressed earlier, speech that incites violence is unprotected by the
First Amendment only when the speaker intends for it to occur.174 Unless
this mens rea requirement is satisfied, Brandenburg shields the speaker
from criminal punishment. Therefore, a critical question in In re Trump is:
What was Donald Trump’s intent when, during a 2016 campaign rally, he
“responded to protesters by stating, ‘Get ’em out of here,’ followed closely
by, ‘Don’t hurt ’em—if I say go ‘get ’em,’ I get in trouble with the
press’”?175 Did Trump intend for those statements to spark crowd members
to attack the plaintiffs?
Resolving this issue is anything but straightforward. Why? Because the
only possible path for concluding that Trump intended to incite violence
runs headfirst through a thicket of circumstantial evidence. One must plow
through indirect evidence and contextual clues because Trump denies his
words were “directed at the crowd.”176 Instead, he claims they were
“intended for professional security personnel to remove the protestors.”177
173

Id. at 56.
See supra Section I.A.1 (discussing the intent prong of the Brandenburg test).
175
In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 2017).
176
Answer of Defendants Donald J. Trump, President of the United States, and Donald J. Trump
for President, Inc., at 5, Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719 (W.D. Ky. 2017) (No. 3:16-cv00247).
177
Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719, 725 (W.D. Ky. 2017) ), rev’d and remanded, 903
174

140

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 51:1

In other words, rather than calling for violence or unlawful conduct by
audience members, Trump contends he simply was “calling for the
removal of disruptive protestors”178 by security officers. In brief, he does
not concede Brandenburg’s intent element. This means, in turn, that
Trump’s intent must be proven by something other than his own
admission.
What circumstantial evidence, then, might be relevant of intent? Three
items seem important: (1) the actual words used (as well as words not
used); (2) the speaker’s understanding of the state of mind of the audience
members who hear those words; and (3) the speaker’s familiarity with how
those same or similar words were received and interpreted in the past by
the same or similar audiences.
As Judge Hale explained, “whether speech constitutes incitement is a
fact-specific inquiry”179 and “context matters.”180 Examining all of the
facts, including the words used and perhaps even the words not used, thus
is essential.
1. The Words Used
Perhaps a suitable starting point is to pose a question: Did Trump’s
words directly reference either violence or unlawful action? The answer is
no. As Trump asserts, “he did not say a single word about unlawful force
or violence.”181 In fact, the president points out “he affirmatively
discouraged violence by telling the audience, ‘Don’t hurt ’em.’”182
In other words, Trump did not utter statements such as “beat ’em up,”
“punch those people” or even “throw ’em out of here.” Those three
messages all carry physical overtones—beating, punching and throwing.
Instead, Trump simply said, “get ’em out of here.”183 He added nothing
about precisely how the protestors were to be, as it were, gotten out of
there.
But at the trial court level, Judge David Hale focused on another aspect
of Trump’s words—namely, that they were organized by Trump in the
form of “an order, an instruction, a command.”184 It was “the
imperative”185 nature of Trump’s words that, for Judge Hale, made
F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2018).
178
Petition for Mandamus, supra note 60.
179
Nwanguma v. Trump, No. 3:16-cv-247-DJH-HBB, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126039, at *2
(W.D. Ky. Aug. 9, 2017) (order granting motion to certify for interlocutory appeal or to reconsider).
180
Id. at *3.
181
Petition for Mandamus, supra note 60, at *14.
182
Id.
183
In re Trump, 874 F.3d 948, 950 (6th Cir. 2017).
184
Nwanguma v. Trump, 273 F. Supp. 3d 719, 727 (W.D. Ky. 2017)), rev’d and remanded, 903
F.3d 604 (6th Cir. 2018).
185
Id.
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plausible the protestors’ claim that Trump was advocating violence. A
second circumstantial factor in the intent inquiry therefore is whether
words that do not directly reference violence are nonetheless strung
together and framed in the form of a directive to take action.
A third circumstantial factor weighing on intent might entail
considering the absence of certain clarifying words that Trump failed to
utter but easily could have. For instance, if Trump’s true intent was to have
his security personnel remove the protestors from the rally, then why didn’t
Trump add one simple, obvious word—specifically, “security”—to his
initial utterance? Why didn’t he say, “Security, get ’em out of here” or
“Get ’em out of here, security”? This phrasing clearly would militate
against finding that Trump intended for audience members—as opposed to
security officials—to “get ’em out of here.” Thus, was Trump’s decision
not to use “security” strategic, creating sufficient ambiguity in his message
that he knew his followers might construe it as a call to action? A court
groping for circumstantial evidence of a speaker’s intent therefore might
consider not simply the words used, but also the words not used—the ones
left unspoken that easily could have been voiced.
Fourth, one might consider that Trump has a well-known tendency to
utter short, declarative phrases with hyperbolic and rhetorical overtones—
particularly on Twitter.186 His “uninhibited”187 tweeting and “pugnacious
rhetoric”188 might indicate that similar short statements at campaign
rallies—“get ’em out of here”—are not intended to incite violence, but
simply are designed to chum the political waters. As one New York judge
recently reasoned in dismissing a defamation claim against Trump based
on a series of tweets, the President’s tweets were “loose, figurative, and
hyperbolic.”189 Such circumstantial evidence of Trump’s intent based on
his style of tweets, however, seems too far removed from the nature of his
in-person words uttered at real-world campaign rallies to be of much
relevance. In other words, the context of Twitter is simply too distinct from
that of a campaign rally to have any bearing on the issue of intent.
None of this, however, necessarily ends the inquiry into the nature of
186
See generally Katie Rogers & Maggie Haberman, Like Father Like Son, Using Twitter as a
Foil to Skewer Political Foes, N.Y. TIMES , July 1, 2017, at A14 (describing President Trump’s
“affection for Twitter as a weapon against political foes,” and adding that “President Trump tends to
fire a digital bazooka when met with a perceived slight, often hitting below the belt and leaving himself
open to bipartisan criticism.”).
187
Peter Baker, Trump Aims at a Mayor, and Foreign Ties Strain, N.Y. TIMES, June 5, 2017, at
A1.
188
Sean Sullivan & Mike DeBonis, Lawmakers Say Trump’s Words Matter—and Hurt the
Country’s
Standing
Abroad,
WASH .
POST
(Feb.
18,
2017),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/powerpost/lawmakers-say-trumps-words-matter--and-are-hurtingthe-countrys-standing-abroad/2017/02/17/1cacaa9e-f55b-11e6-a9b0ecee7ce475fc_story.html?utm_term=.ca7dfc4d7064.
189
Jacobus v. Trump, 51 N.Y.S.3d 330, 342 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017).
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Trump’s statement. Why? As Professor Michael Vitiello notes in reference
to an observation by famed Harvard First Amendment scholar Zechariah
Chafee, “Marc Antony avoided making explicit incitement to avenge
Caesar’s assassination. But any reasonable listener would have understood
that to be his message.”190 Professor David Crump aptly calls this
“camouflaged incitement,”191 meaning situations “without words of
express incitement.”192 More bluntly, it is possible for a person to
deliberately code a message advocating violence rather than blatantly
stating it.
Crump points out that Brandenburg says nothing about the incitement
test being fulfilled only by examining the literal words used.193 Instead,
“Brandenburg leaves all relevant factors open to consideration, including
the context, the medium, the audience, and the speaker.”194 It thus is worth
considering the state of the audience that attended his Louisville rally in
the next subsection.
2. The Speaker’s Understanding of the Audience’s State of Mind
A court might consider, as circumstantial evidence of Donald Trump’s
intent, his awareness or lack thereof of whether his supporters at the rally
were already riled up immediately before he exclaimed “get ’em out of
here.” In other words, if Trump perceived from his vantage point on the
stage that the individuals who were next to (or in very close physical
proximity to) the protestors were already agitated or stirred up, this might
indicate that he intended his words to spark violence. The logic here—were
a court to follow this path—would be that Trump recognized he didn’t
need to use words directly referencing violence because, under the
circumstances, he knew the more neutral sounding “get ’em out of here”
would likely produce the same violent result. Trump’s understanding of his
audience’s state of mind—its readiness and willingness to pounce, as it
were—thereby might be relevant on the intent inquiry.
Similarly, if Trump knew that there were violent skirmishes between
his supporters and protestors immediately prior to taking the podium to
begin his talk, then this might indicate that Trump intended his words to
cause violence. In other words, if Trump knew violence had already
transpired—that his supporters were in a fighting mood—then this might
indicate that a directive to take action like “get ’em out of here” was
intended to spark further trouble.
190
Michael Vitiello, The Nuremberg Files: Testing the Outer Limits of the First Amendment, 61
O HIO ST . L.J. 1175, 1211 (2000).
191
Crump, supra note 145, at 2.
192
Id. at 22.
193
Id. at 54.
194
Id.
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3. The Speaker’s Knowledge of Prior Responses to the Words
If Trump knew that his use of the phrase “get ’em out of here” or
something substantially similar to it had triggered violence by his
supporters against protestors at prior campaign rallies in other cities, then
this might serve as circumstantial evidence of his intent for them to once
again spark violence, this time in Louisville. The logic here is that a
reasonable speaker who used a phrase in the past that caused violence
would avoid using that same phrase again in order to prevent such a
disturbance. Who, in other words, would want to use a message that caused
trouble in the past? Law abiding people seemingly would not. A person
who intended to trigger violence, however, would use the phrase again
because of that person’s prior success with provoking it.
Importantly, however, there is a critical difference between mere
knowledge that violence might occur by using certain words, on the one
hand, and the actual intent to cause it to occur, on the other.195 The
Brandenburg test demands the latter for speech to be unprotected. A judge
thus would need to make a leap in logic that bridges knowledge with intent
when considering whether knowledge that a message caused violence in
the past constitutes circumstantial evidence of present intent.
Ultimately, as the analysis above suggests, fathoming intent to commit
violence from circumstantial evidence amounts to little more than a
guessing game. In cases such as In re Trump—ones in which a speaker
both vehemently denies an intent to commit violence and uses words that
do not directly reference violence—proving intent under Brandenburg is a
steep, uphill battle.
B. Trump and the Likelihood of Violence: Considering Prior Violence
As described earlier, Brandenburg requires that violence or unlawful
conduct must be likely to occur for speech to fall beyond First Amendment
protection.196 A key issue for cases such as In re Trump, therefore, is the
weight that should be assigned in the likelihood analysis to prior acts of
violence committed by a speaker’s supporters. Indeed, subsequent to the
event in Louisville that sparked the lawsuit examined in this article, several
incidents of violence arose at Trump rallies.197 These after-the-fact violent
events obviously would not affect the likelihood factor in In re Trump.
They would, however, be relevant in future incitement cases involving
195
See Volokh, supra note 105, at 1382 (“Indeed, one of the foundational opinions on which
Brandenburg v. Ohio indirectly rests—Justice Holmes’s dissent in Abrams v. United States—made
much of the distinction between knowledge and purpose.”).
196
See supra Part I.A.3 (discussing the likelihood prong of the Brandenburg test).
197
See Tumulty et al., supra note 56, at A1 (reporting that “[v]iolence at Trump’s rallies has
escalated sharply” and noting that a Trump supporter at a Fayetteville, North Carolina, rally “punched a
protestor”).
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altercations at Trump’s speaking engagements.
How, then, should a court determine likelihood of violence in
scenarios such as In re Trump? As a starting point, a positive correlation
between past acts of violence, on the one hand, and a present likelihood of
violence, on the other, seems ripe for judicial consideration. In other
words, the greater the number of incidents of violence associated with
Trump’s words in the past, the greater the odds of violence occurring in the
present.
In examining past incidents of violence, however, several factors seem
essential for judicial examination beyond simply the sheer number of prior
acts of violence. In brief, courts must dig deeper than raw numerosity.
Three additional factors seem especially relevant. They are proposed
immediately below.
First, a court might apply what this article calls a ratio-based factor—
one that contextualizes the number of incidents of past violence at Trump
speaking events with the total number of Trump speaking events, including
those at which no violence occurred. If, hypothetically, Trump had made
100 speaking appearances in the prior six months and violence had erupted
at ten of those events, then does this ten percent frequency provide either a
court or a police officer on the scene of a Trump rally with a lawful reason
under Brandenburg to predict that violence is likely to occur again? What
if violence had arisen forty percent of the time at prior Trump speeches?
Brandenburg offers no such formula or guidance, instead leaving the
likelihood determination to a rough, speculative estimate by a judge or
officer. Indeed, Brandenburg even fails to modify the term “likely” with
words such as “reasonably,” “substantially,” or “highly”—modifiers that
might add clarity to the test by establishing a threshold of likelihood.198
Second, courts also should account for the amount of time that has
lapsed or transpired since a prior incident occurred. This constitutes a
temporal-distance factor. Here, the formula is: the longer the lag time, the
less the likelihood. This would particularly be the case if several speeches
had occurred peacefully subsequent to the last incident of violence. Put
differently: the more recent the prior acts of violence, the more likely
violence is to occur. Again, however, Brandenburg is maddingly silent on
such a consideration.
Third, even if there have been both numerous and recent incidents of
violence, the likelihood factor is not inevitably elevated. That might be the
case if—precisely because of such recent incidents—a speaker
significantly ratchets up the level of security and law enforcement presence
for current and future events. This law enforcement-presence factor thus
198
The decision simply requires that the speech is “likely to incite or produce such action.”
Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
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requires a judge (in the courtroom after an event) or an officer (on the
scene at the event, watching and ready to stop it if need be under
Brandenburg) to consider how crowd members might respond if they see a
massive law enforcement presence. The logic here is that a large turnout by
law enforcement would reduce the odds of the speaker inciting violence
because crowd members would not want to risk arrest and, in turn, a
criminal record and possible incarceration. In brief, a strong, highly visible
showing of security forces might deter violence. Deterrence means that the
likelihood of violence is reduced, and Brandenburg requires violence to be
likely for speech to be unprotected. The Court’s decision in Brandenburg,
however, did not address this consideration.
The factual scenario at the heart of In re Trump thus illustrates
multiple problems with determining likelihood of violence under
Brandenburg. This Article, in turn, proposes three variables—ones beyond
the raw numerosity of prior incidents of violence—to add rigor to the
likelihood analysis. The three variables are: (1) the ratio-based factor; (2)
the temporal-distance factor; and (3) the law enforcement-presence factor.
This list is not intended to exclude other considerations from judicial
analysis, but simply is designed to serve as a consistent, core collection of
variables.
In summary, this Part used In re Trump to demonstrate the complexity
of proving both the intent and likelihood elements of Brandenburg.
Fathoming intent becomes a legal nightmare in cases such as In re Trump
where the speaker denies desire to foment violence. Circumstantial
evidence thus is necessary to prove intent, and this Article has offered four
factors to help guide this analysis. These factors are: (1) the words used;
(2) the words not used; (3) the speaker’s understanding of his audience’s
state of mind; and (4) the speaker’s knowledge of prior responses to the
words used. Similarly, this Article has advanced three suggestions to
improve the likelihood determination: the ratio of prior acts of violence to
all speeches given by the defendant, the lag time or gap between the most
recent incident of violence and the present event, and the size and visibility
of law enforcement at the present event.
This Article next examines other Brandenburg issues that are
highlighted by the recent spate of lawsuits filed against public universities
on behalf of Richard Spencer.
III. INCITEMENT, PRIOR RESTRAINTS, & THE HECKER’S VETO: EXPOSING
AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP AMONG FREE-SPEECH DOCTRINES THROUGH
THE LENS OF THE RICHARD SPENCER LAWSUITS
At the same time Brandenburg takes center stage in the case against
Donald Trump, the case is enmeshed in multiple lawsuits filed on behalf of
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Richard Spencer against major public universities.
The institutions
caught in the legal crosshairs want to prevent Spencer, “president of the
National Policy Institute, a white nationalist think tank,”200 from speaking.
They fear that either his mere presence or his words will incite violence.201
As University of Florida President Kent Fuchs explained his initial
decision to deny Spencer access, “it was about violence”202 and public
safety.203 Indeed, a January 2018 article in the Washington Post notes that
Spencer’s potential campus appearances “put public schools in the difficult
position of balancing the First Amendment with their concerns about
safety.”204
For example, Pennsylvania State University President Eric Barron
echoed key language from Brandenburg when his institution denied
Spencer access in August 2017. As Barron put it, “the First Amendment
does not require our University to risk imminent violence”205 and “the
likelihood of disruption and violence.”206 Those statements tap directly into
both the imminence and likelihood elements of Brandenburg.207
Fears of trouble caused by Spencer’s presence stem from the August
199
See supra note 48 (identifying lawsuits filed on Spencer’s behalf against Auburn University,
Michigan State University, Ohio State University, and Pennsylvania State University, and providing
links to the complaints in each of those cases).
200
Leonard Greene, Rogue’s Gallery: Racist Alt-Right Feeds off Trump Rhetoric as White House
Fills
up
with
Fringe
Voices,
N.Y.
D AILY
N EWS
(Aug.
14,
2017),
http://www.nydailynews.com/news/national/racist-alt-right-feeds-president-trump-rhetoric-article1.3408936.
201
The universities also object to hosting Spencer because of his views. At Pennsylvania State
University, President Eric Barron stated when he denied Spencer access to the University Park,
Pennsylvania, campus, “I disagree profoundly with the content that has been presented publicly about
this speaker’s views which are abhorrent and contradictory to our University’s values. There is no place
for hatred, bigotry or racism in our society and on our campuses.” Press Release, Pennsylvania State
University, Richard Spencer Is Not Welcome to Speak at Penn State (Aug. 22, 2017),
http://news.psu.edu/story/478590/2017/08/22/administration/richard-spencer-not-welcome-speak-pennstate. But as described later, both viewpoint-based discrimination and censoring offensive statements
violate the First Amendment freedom of speech, and thus they do not provide a legal justification for
barring Spencer from campus. See infra notes 211–17 and accompanying text.
202
Audra D. S. Burch, Campuses Brace for Angry Words, N.Y. T IMES , Jan. 18, 2018, at A18.
203
See id. (“On Aug. 16, Florida officially rejected the National Policy Institute’s application,
citing public safety concerns. The decision, Mr. Fuchs said, was based on the specter of violence, not
Mr. Spencer’s pointed ideology.”); Claire McNeill, UF’s Move to Deny White Nationalist Richard
Spencer a Venue Sets Up a First Amendment Court Fight, TAMPA BAY TIMES , Aug. 17, 2017, at 1
(quoting Fuchs for the proposition that “[t]he likelihood of violence and potential injury—not the
words or ideas—has caused us to take this action”).
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Susan Svrluga, Richard Spencer Supporter Sues University, Calling Security Fee for Campus
Speech Unconstitutional, WASH. POST (Jan. 10, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/gradepoint/wp/2018/01/10/richard-spencer-supporter-sues-university-calling-security-fee-for-campusspeech-unconstitutional/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.bd3f52910cd2.
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Press Release, Pennsylvania State University, supra note 201.
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Id.
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See supra text accompanying notes 92–93 (describing the three key elements of Brandenburg
as intent, imminence, and likelihood).
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2017 violence in Charlottesville, Virginia, where he was present for a
Unite the Right rally.208 Although a report released that December blamed
the mayhem on factors other than Spencer,209 Charlottesville became
central to universities’ efforts to deny him access to their campuses. For
example, when Michigan State University initially denied Spencer access
to its campus, it maintained that “[t]he decision was made due to
significant concerns about public safety in the wake of the tragic violence
at a rally in Charlottesville.”210
Brandenburg, as discussed below, may provide public universities
with an entrée for stopping Richard Spencer from talking on campus.
Several other legal arguments, however, simply don’t hold water. For
instance, squelching Spencer based on his controversial, white-nationalist
position violates the well-established principle against viewpoint
discrimination.211 As Justice Anthony Kennedy explained in 2017,
viewpoint discrimination is a “subtype”212 of content-based speech
regulation.213 It occurs when the government regulates speech within a
particular subject matter by singling “out a subset of messages for disfavor
based on the views expressed.”214 Kennedy elaborated that principle with:
The danger of viewpoint discrimination is that the government is
attempting to remove certain ideas or perspectives from a broader debate.
That danger is all the greater if the ideas or perspectives are ones a
particular audience might think offensive, at least at first hearing. An initial
reaction may prompt further reflection, leading to a more reasoned, more
tolerant position.215Similarly, blocking Spencer from campus because his
views offend is unconstitutional. As Justice William Brennan wrote for the
208
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Court in protecting the right to burn the American flag as a form of
symbolic expression, “If there is a bedrock principle underlying the First
Amendment, it is that the government may not prohibit the expression of
an idea simply because society finds the idea itself offensive or
disagreeable.”216 In a nutshell, it is unconstitutional to ban a contentious
speaker, such as Richard Spencer, either because of his viewpoint or
because of the offense others take.
It thus is unsurprising that when U.S. District Judge W. Keith Watkins
ordered Auburn University to allow Spencer to speak on campus in April
2017, he reasoned that the institution:
[C]ancelled the speech based on its belief that listeners and
protest groups opposed to Mr. Spencer’s ideology would
react to the content of his speech by engaging in protests that
could cause violence or property damage. However,
discrimination on the basis of message content “cannot be
tolerated under the First Amendment,” and “[l]isteners’
reaction to speech is not a content-neutral basis for
regulation.”217
The proper test to apply—the one Judge Watkins, in fact, applied—
was Brandenburg.218 He found that “Auburn did not produce evidence that
Mr. Spencer’s speech is likely to incite or produce imminent lawless
action.”219 Watkins’s decision, however, occurred prior to the
Charlottesville violence.
Before examining how Brandenburg applies in post-Charlottesville
cases involving Richard Spencer, it is important to briefly address the
fighting words exception to First Amendment protection established in
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire.220 Might Chaplinsky be used successfully
to stop Spencer from speaking? It is highly doubtful.
The fighting words exception would only silence Richard Spencer if he
used personally abusive epithets directed at specific individuals in a faceto-face situation.221 The fighting words doctrine targets words “that are so
insulting in both content and delivery that they are likely to provoke the
listener to respond violently.”222 As the Supreme Court explained in 1989,
fighting words involve “a direct personal insult or an invitation to
216
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exchange fisticuffs.”
Racist views like Spencer’s positions, standing
alone, do not amount to fighting words.224 Furthermore, the Supreme Court
has not upheld a fighting words conviction since Chaplinsky.225 There is no
evidence that Richard Spencer yells racist epithets directly at minorities in
a face-to-face fighting words scenario.226
Additionally, because “courts must determine on a case-by-case basis
all of the circumstances relevant to whether a reasonable person in the
position of the actual addressee would have been likely to respond with
violence,”227 the fighting words doctrine simply cannot be used as a blunt,
preemptive-strike mechanism to stop a person from coming to campus. A
person must have the opportunity to utter some words before he or she can
be squelched for engaging in fighting words.
In summary, dual First Amendment doctrines that prohibit viewpoint
discrimination and protect offensive expression tilt in favor of Richard
Spencer’s right to speak at public universities. Additionally, the fighting
words exception to First Amendment protection does not permit banning
him from campus; it would only apply if he starts to speak and then
engages in targeted, personally abusive epithets. Public universities are
therefore largely left clinging to the Brandenburg test if they want to
permissibly silence Richard Spencer on campus.
This raises an important series of questions. Can Brandenburg be used
to stop Richard Spencer from ever stepping foot on campus? Does it
provide a public university with a tool for enacting a prior restraint on his
presence based upon past violence on other campuses? Or alternatively,
does Brandenburg come into play only after Spencer begins speaking?
Must an individual like Spencer—one who carries with him (at least, as
public universities want to portray it) a past history of violence—be
afforded the chance to start talking before Brandenburg becomes relevant?
As described above, prior restraints are presumptively
unconstitutional.228 Yet, the Supreme Court in Near v. Minnesota229
suggested they are permissible to protect “[t]he security of the community
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life . . . against incitements to acts of violence . . . .” In other words,
Near provides a bridge to Brandenburg. Interpreted broadly, this suggests
Brandenburg can function as a prior restraint vehicle—but this is only
partially correct.
Brandenburg is merely a cutoff mechanism; it can be used to cut off a
person who is presently talking, thereby restraining in advance whatever
portion of the person’s planned speech remains. More colloquially,
Brandenburg can only quiet a person based upon what he is saying, not
based upon what he has said on prior occasions. Until a person begins
saying something, Brandenburg is impotent to stop him. In brief, Richard
Spencer must be given the opportunity to begin speaking. Once he
commences, police may then stifle him under Brandenburg if they believe
his words are both intended and likely to produce imminent violence.
Using Brandenburg preemptively—specifically, using it to stop
Spencer before he even has a chance to begin his speech—would allow
government entities to silence him merely because they think they know
what he is going to say in the future. In other words, Public University X
would be able to stop Spencer from speaking on its campus because it
believes he is going to say the exact same thing he said on the campus of
Public University Y. Using Brandenburg in this fashion would permit the
government to stop speech based on mere speculation and supposition
about not only what a person would be saying, but also about what his
intent (a key element of Brandenburg231) would be with those words. Thus,
much like a libel-proof plaintiff who is condemned by his prior bad acts,232
Spencer would be perpetually damned in the eyes of the law under
Brandenburg based upon his past bad words.
It is not inconceivable that Spencer might, in fact, want to test out a
different tack or approach to conveying his message when visiting
campuses, hoping to find a better way to market and sell his views. After
all, if Spencer wants to win over potential new followers, why would he
keep peddling a failed product?233 To ban Spencer based on his past speech
is to cynically suppose that his views—or at least his strategies for
conveying them—will never evolve or change. He must be provided the
230
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opportunity to speak before censorship under Brandenburg is permitted.
Furthermore, Brandenburg’s imminence requirement dispels the
notion that the test can be used preemptively.234 This is due to the fact that,
if imminence requires a close temporal connection between the words
uttered and the violence that is likely to follow, then stopping a speaker
based on words that were uttered days, weeks, or even months in the past
fails to satisfy this Brandenburg criterion. The gap in time is simply too
long to satisfy Brandenburg’s imminence facet. The Richard Spencer cases
thus reveal the complex relationship between prior restraints and
incitement of violence.
The cases also illustrate the relationship between Brandenburg—
specifically, Brandenburg’s “likelihood” requirement235—and the heckler’s
veto doctrine.236 As Professor R. George Wright describes it, the heckler’s
veto doctrine states that “opponents of a speaker should not be permitted to
suppress the speech in question through their own threatened or actual
violence.”237
When law enforcement personnel turn out in large numbers to prevent
Richard Spencer from being the victim of a heckler’s veto—as illustrated
by this exact occurrence at the University of Florida in October 2017238—
the Brandenburg analysis is necessarily impacted. The larger the presence
of police to prevent a heckler’s veto, the less likely it is that violence will
occur—assuming, of course, that most reasonable people do not want to be
arrested.239 In brief, there is an inverse correlation between the number of
police at a Spencer campus speech, and the likelihood of that speech
causing violence; as the number of police officers increases, the likelihood
of violence decreases because the odds of being arrested are higher.
The canon against allowing a heckler’s veto thus helps Richard
Spencer in two ways. First, it prevents him from being attacked by
234
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protestors. The government, in fact, funds the police, as it did at the
University of Florida, to keep Spencer out of harm’s way and to allow him
to speak.240 As University of Florida President Kent Fuchs noted, there
were “nearly 1,000 state and local law-enforcement officers on campus”
when Spencer spoke,241 which cost the University more than $600,000.242
Second, the heckler’s veto doctrine allows Richard Spencer to
successfully espouse more of his views because the police presence
necessary to protect him from a hostile crowd also reduces the likelihood
of violence that Brandenburg requires for speech to be cut off. In other
words, Spencer is less likely to incite his own followers to commit
imminent violence because they know—by witnessing a sizable police
turnout—they are more likely to be arrested than in the absence of such a
turnout.
The police officers who must be present at Spencer’s campus speeches
due to the heckler’s veto doctrine thus prevent violence by both protestors
and supporters. The irony is that, were it not for the heckler’s veto doctrine
and the ratcheted-up security it requires to safeguard Spencer, his speech
could more easily be censored under Brandenburg. That’s because—at
least in theory—the less intense the police presence, the more likely it is
for violence to occur. In turn, the more likely it is for violence to occur, the
more likely the speech in question will be stopped under Brandenburg.
Imagine, for example, that Spencer were to give the exact same speech
using the exact same words at two different campuses in front of the exact
same number of protestors. At Campus A, there are 200 police officers on
the scene. At Campus B, however, there are only five officers present.
The theory posed here is that the presence of 200 officers reduces the
likelihood of Spencer inciting violence on Campus A more than the
presence of only five officers on Campus B. This reduction in likelihood of
violence on Campus A, in turn, also reduces the ability of those officers to
stop Spencer from speaking under Brandenburg. In brief, the governmentfunded security mandated by the heckler’s veto doctrine not only serves
the intended purpose of preventing protestors from attacking Spencer, but
also effects the unintended consequence of allowing Spencer to get away
with more hateful, race-baiting speech under Brandenburg by reducing the
likelihood of violence.
In summary, the battles now being fought between Richard Spencer’s
supporters and public universities highlight issues surrounding
240
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Brandenburg’s relationship to the doctrines against both prior restraints
and hecklers’ vetoes.
CONCLUSION
The Brandenburg incitement test, as Professor Mark Strasser observes,
“is thought by many to represent an extremely speech protective
doctrine.”243 Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit recently noted that “[i]t is not an easy task to find that speech rises
to such a dangerous level that it can be deemed incitement to riot.”244 This
Article, however, illustrates that it is also not an easy task to apply the
Brandenburg standard. Specifically, there are multiple problems with
Brandenburg’s application, as illustrated by analysis of In re Trump and
the Richard Spencer lawsuits.
In re Trump demonstrates the difficulty with proving Brandenburg’s
intent requirement when a speaker both denies an intent to incite violence
and when the speaker’s words do not directly reference violence. This
Article has proposed multiple ways of using circumstantial evidence to
address this problem.
Additionally, In re Trump highlights problems regarding the extent to
which past acts of violence at a speaker’s events should influence
Brandenburg’s likelihood analysis. This Article has proposed three
variables besides the raw number of acts of prior violence—namely a
ratio-based factor, a temporal-distance factor, and a law enforcement
presence factor— for courts to consider on the likelihood issue. These
variables should add rigor to judicial review of Brandenburg’s likelihood
requirement.
The Richard Spencer lawsuits raise the issue of whether Brandenburg
can be used as a prior restraint mechanism by government entities, with
public universities as a leading example, to halt a speaker before he even
begins his speech. Brandenburg is merely a cutoff mechanism, not one for
making preemptive strikes that ban a speaker from appearing on campus.
Additionally, the Spencer cases illustrate the complex relationship
between the heckler’s veto doctrine and Brandenburg’s incitement test.
Ultimately, the heckler’s veto doctrine has the unintended consequence of
letting individuals like Richard Spencer safely deliver more of their
ideological speech under Brandenburg.
As Brandenburg approaches its fiftieth anniversary in 2019, it begs for
judicial clarification on the application of all three of its prongs—intent,
imminence, and likelihood—and its relationship to both prior restraints and
243
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the heckler’s veto doctrine. Clarence Brandenburg, Donald Trump, and
Richard Spencer all—in their own provocative ways—have pushed the
envelope of First Amendment protection for speech to its breaking point.

